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I. INTRODUCTIONCARLOS Slim, currently the number one billionaire in the world
according to Forbes,' presently owns Telefonos de Mexico
(Telmex) and Am6rica M6vil, which are the two large companies
dominating the Mexican telecommunications market today.2 Further-
more, Telmex owns 90 percent of the landline industry in Mexico while
Am6rica M6vil serves "over 200 million wireless customers" throughout
Latin America making it "the largest mobile phone carrier in Latin
America." 3 Some point to such metrics as proof that Slim-whose esti-
mated fortune at $68.5 billion is nearly 4 percent of Mexico's annual eco-
nomic output- is a monopolist. 4
While anti-competitive provisions have been instilled since the found-
ing of Mexico through the Constitutions of 1856 and 1917,5 the Mexican
government has indirectly endorsed the monopoly by prohibiting foreign
investment through inhibiting the activity and participation of foreign in-
vestors.6 The Mexican government has also undermined the efforts of
the Federal Commission of Telecommunications, the regulatory agency in
charge of regulating telecommunications in Mexico.7 The Federal Com-
mission of Telecommunications (Cofetel) is governed by the Federal Law
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1. The World's Billionaires, FORBES, (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/billion
aires/.





5. Gabriel Castafieda, Mexico's Competition Regime: Walking the Walk, Slowly, 6
No. 1 COMiPiTrrION L. INT'L no. 1, 2010 at 37.
6. Frederick V. Perry, The Foreign Investment Transaction in Mexico, 8 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 67, 67 (1985).
7. Informaci6n General, COMISION FEDERAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES, http://www.
cft.gob.mx:8080/portal/informacion-general/ (last visited May 19, 2013).
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of Telecommunications instituted in 1995.8 In addition to the Federal
Law of Telecommunications, Mexico has instituted two other statutes on
competition which were never enforced "due to the overwhelming role of
designated state monopolies, price controls and complex regulatory
web."9
Furthermore, the lack of enforcement concerning Mexico's anti-trust
laws has caused tensions between Mexico and other countries. For exam-
ple, the United States filed a panel report which resulted in the World
Trade Organization finding that Mexico violated its GATS commitments
by failing to adopt anti-competitive measures and failing to provide rea-
sonable access to cross-border telecommunications suppliers.'0
II. THE HISTORY OF TELMEX AND AM1 RICA MOVIL
The modern Mexican telecommunications industry began in 1947 when
Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex) was created through the acquisition of two
international telephone companies that were active in Mexico, L.M. Er-
iccson and the International Telegraph Corporation." Once the private
company merger was complete, the Mexican government imposed a tele-
phone service tax on long-distance telephone calls to supply revenue for
the addition of telephone lines around the country in order to compete
competently with the United States and other countries in the communi-
cations field.12 Hence, in 1972 the Mexican government's role transi-
tioned from cooperating greatly with Telmex to owning the majority of
the company when it purchased 51 percent of Telmex shares. 3 During
1984 Mexico faced a severe debt crisis which was addressed by the Ma-
drid administration through the cutting of government expenditures and
introducing minor privatizations.14
More drastic market reforms were instituted by the Salinas administra-
tion especially with regards to the privatization of Telmex, one of the
largest state-owned enterprises in Mexico.15 Salinas had several reasons
for instituting the privatization of Telmex which included demonstrating
to the international community and foreign investors that Mexico be-
lieved in competition and a free market, increasing Telmex's efficiency
without political bureaucracy, and, lastly, helping Mexico's debt by the
8. Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones [Telecommunications Law], as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 7 de Junio de 1995 (Mex.).
9. Castafieda, supra note 5, at 37.
10. Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 8.1(c)-
(d), WT/DS204/R (April 2, 2004).
11. Telefonos de Mexico S.A. de CV. History, FuNDING UNIVEisE, http://www.fund
inguniverse.com/company-histories/telefonos-de-mexico-s-a-de-c-v-history/ (last
visited May 19, 2013).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Luigi Manzetti, Are You Being Served? The Consequences of Telmex Monopolistic
Privatization, 16 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 781, 785 (2010).
15. Id. at 785-786.
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selling of the government's shares in the company. 16 In 1990, Telmex be-
gan accepting bids from private investors which ended with Carlos Slim,
owner of Grupo Curso, winning the bid. 17 Furthermore, Slim had formed
a partnership with Southwestern Bell and France Telecom prior to win-
ning the Telmex bid because he believed that both companies had the
knowledge and technological innovations crucial to bolster Telmex into a
powerful telecommunications company while he had the political connec-
tions necessary to strengthen Telmex.18
Concerning Slim's political connections, he had been instrumental in
the NAFTA negotiations as well as a staunch supporter of the Salinas
administration and the PRI.19 Hence, Slim's political associations paid
off when he acquired Telmex in addition to a seven year monopoly with
respect to international and domestic telephone calls.20 In addition, the
Mexican government did not create a regulatory agency to regulate the
Telmex monopoly nor did it follow Mexico's anti-competition laws lo-
cated in the Constitution. 21 Essentially, Telmex was granted a monopoly
for seven years in the international and domestic areas of telecommunica-
tions in addition to assurances for investment and pricing.22 Thus,
Telmex remained an unregulated monopoly with the exception of "the
enforcement of the concession by the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes (Secretary of Communications and Transportation (SCT)." 23
As a result, the "Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones" (Federal Tele-
communications Law) 2 4 was implemented to establish a private and com-
petitive market in the area of telecommunications and to create a
regulatory structure during the Telmex monopoly. 25 Furthermore the
Federal Telecommunications Law was established to resolve difficulties in
telecommunications such as the restrictions on the amount of companies
in the telecommunications area, the lack of division of the market, the
ability of various network operators offering all the services their compa-
nies could support, and the necessity of "technical plans for the intercon-
nection in non-discriminatory terms." 2 6
16. FUNDING UNIVERSE, supra note 11.
17. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 788.
18. FUNDING UNIVERSE, supra note 11.
19. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 788.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Roger G. Noll, Priorities in Telecommunications Reform 2-3 (Stanford Inst. for
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 06-035, 2007), available at http://
www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/
pdf/06-35.pdf.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, supra note 8.
25. Noll, supra note 22, at 3.
26. Jana Palacios Prieto, Telecommunications Industry in Mexico: Performance and
Market Structure Analysis, and Conflicts of Interest Prevailing Between Operators
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The Federal Telecommunications Law also currently governs the Comi-
si6n Federal de Telecomunicaciones (Federal Telecommunications Com-
mission, also known as Cofetel) which was established by a presidential
decree in 1996 as a regulatory body.27 Unfortunately, Cofetel had great
difficulty regulating the "incumbent former monopolist" Telmex due to
Telmex's political clout and economic power.28 Another win for Telmex
was that the Federal Telecommunications law implemented strict invest-
ment guidelines on emerging competitors, prohibited foreign investment,
and awarded Telmex with significant network rents.2 9 Consequently,
most consumers selected to use Telmex services due to the wide array of
services offered as compared to small forthcoming competitors that of-
fered limited services and were forced to use the Telmex network. 30
Concerning the cell phone industry, Slim realized the importance of the
growing market and concurrently won the bid for Radiom6vil Dipsa in
1990 when he bid for Telmex.3 1 As a result, the popular brand Telcel
emerged from Radiom6vil Dipsa.32 Furthermore, Telcel emerged as a
strong competitor in the mobile telephone sector in the 1980s due to two
significant advantages.3 3 First, it was the only telephone company that
could offer mobile telephone services to customers in the entire country;
second, Telcel had access to buildings and locations owned by Telmex
that allowed Telcel to cultivate its wireless network throughout the coun-
try. 3 4 In addition, lusacell was the dominant leader in the cell phone
market prior to the entrance of Telcel but lusacell had great difficulty
competing with Telcel due to Telcel's initial advantages.35 Consequently,
Telcel managed to acquire 70 percent of the market share of mobile
phone carriers. 36 In an attempt to regain control of the mobile phone
market, Grupo Salinas bought lusacell in 2005 with the hopes of compet-
ing with Telcel.37 Unfortunately, that aspiration came to an end due to
Telcel's prominent market presence because of Telcel's early advan-
tages. 38 Currently, Telcel, owned by Am6rica M6vil, has expanded into
the Latin American market infiltrating "Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Guatemala."39
27. Noll, supra note 22, at 3.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 789.
30. Id.
31. Maria Elena Guti6rrez Renteria, Mexican Telecommunication Industry: Challenges
and Opportunities in the Digital Age, 4 J. SPANISH LANGUAGE MEDIA 55, 61
(2011).
32. Biography, CARLOS SLIM HEW, http://www.carlosslim.com/biografia-ing.html
(last visited May 22, 2013).
33. Prieto, supra note 26, at 15.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 16.
36. OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Mexico, ORGANI-
SATION FOR ECON. Co-oPERATION AND DEv., 9-12 (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.
oecd.org/internet/broadbandandtelecom/49536828.pdf [hereinafter OECD].
37. Prieto, supra note 26, at 16.
38. Id.
39. OECD, supra note 36, at 23.
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III. ANTI-TRUST LAWS IN MEXICO
A. MEXICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROvIsIONs ON COMPETITION
Although Telmex and Am6rica M6vil have flourished due to monopo-
listic practices, anti-trust laws were set in place since the Constitution. 40
Yet the lack of constitutional enforcement occurred because of the role of
appointed state monopolies, the regulation of prices, and "a complex reg-
ulatory web" which lasted for seventy years.41 Furthermore, the Mexican
Constitution of 1917 includes an article solely dedicated to addressing
monopolies.42 Specifically, Article 28 forbids the occurrence of monopo-
lies and "monopolistic practices.43 The article further threatens to
harshly punish manufacturers, business owners, service providers or indi-
viduals that inhibit free trade or competition and that raise their prices to
exaggerated levels detrimental to consumers.44 Conversely, the article al-
lows the government to partake in certain monopolistic practices which
include the following areas: the postal service, telegraphs, radiotele-
graphs, petroleum, radioactive minerals, nuclear energy, electricity, satel-
lite communications, railroads, and issues of national security just to
name a few.4 5
B. THE FEDERAL LAW ON ECONOMIC COMPETITION
Although anti-monopolistic notions were instilled in the Constitution,
the history of modern anti-trust laws began with the creation of the Fed-
eral Law on Economic Competition (FLEC),46 which was enacted in
1993.47 The drafters of FLEC created the law to implement fair competi-
tion in the face of large state controlled monopolies, ignored guidelines,
staunch barriers to entry into the market, and an assortment of "fore-
closed economic activities." 48 Specifically, the drafters attempted to in-
still the following eight objectives in FLEC: to endorse efficiency in the
marketplace through the removal of the inability to allow social mobility,
to guard competition to acquire lower prices and higher levels of innova-
tion, to use free trade to avoid monopolistic actions, to reduce obstacles
from allowing market entrants, to facilitate access to the market to en-
dorse competition, to avoid ineffective price controls that inhibit the mar-
ket, to allow intervention by a regulatory agency, and to uncover state
created monopolies.49
40. Castafieda, supra note 5, at 37.
41. Id.
42. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, Diario




46. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Law on Economic
Competition], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Diciembre
de 1992 (Mex.).
47. Castafleda, supra note 5, at 37.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 37-38.
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Additionally, Chapter II of FLEC addresses monopolies and monopo-
listic practices.50 Specifically, Article 8 states "[m]onopolies and state
monopolies are prohibited, and also those practices which. . .diminish,
impair or prevent competition and free participation in the production,
processing, distribution and marketing of goods and services." 5' Further-
more, Articles 9 through 13 merely expand on what monopolistic prac-
tices entail, the conditions necessary to prove monopolistic practices are
present, what constitutes as relevant markets, and the factors that need to
be addressed when evaluating if an economic agent has significant influ-
ence in the relevant market.52
The factors are listed in Article 13 and consist of: (i) analyzing the
market share and discerning whether the agent can individually set prices
or limit the supply without competitors having the ability to stabilize the
market; (ii) evaluating the "entry barriers" and the components that may
change the barriers; (iii) examining the competitors' powers and promi-
nence in the marketplace; (iv) discovering whether access to input is
available to the agent and the competitors; and (v) analyzing the agent's
current actions. 53 Moreover, FLEC forbids absolute monopolistic prac-
tices in Article 10 which includes apportioning segments of the market,
fixing prices, inhibiting output, and/or fixing bids. 5 4 Absolute monopolis-
tic practices are considered "per se illegal" and the offending agent may
be subjected to a fine up to $7 million for each act.55
IV. REGULATORY AGENCIES
A. THE FEDERAL COMPETITION COMMISSION
Besides emphasizing the prohibition of monopolistic practices, FLEC
also created the Comisi6n Federal de Competencia (Federal Competition
Commission) (Cofeco). 56 Congress created Cofeco to act as a regulatory
body enforcing the anti-monopolistic provisions stated in FLEC. The cre-
ation of Cofeco is attributed to the government's attempt to combat mo-
nopolistic practices. 57 Furthermore, Article 24 grants Cofeco the capacity
to investigate monopolies and monopolistic practices, to implement
guidelines to thwart monopolies, to hear cases and inflict administrative
sanctions, to remark on public programs instilled by the government
which contradict the notions of competition, to review and remark on
proposed legislation and regulations, to comment on established laws, al-
though Cofeco's comments will not be legally binding, to administer the
procedures of the Cofeco within, and to aid the Mexican government in
50. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, supra note 46, at 2-5.
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 3-5
53. Id. at 4.
54. Castafteda, supra note 5, at 39.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, supra note 46, at 7.
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drafting international treaties or agreements.58
FLEC also grants Cofeco the ability to discern if an agent has sufficient
market dominance and may recommend the government to enact reme-
dies to control such dominance.59 Cofeco's powers also allow the regula-
tory body to decide if an agent is suitable to engage in "spectrum actions"
and may "determine the spectrum caps for an individual [agent]." 60 In
addition, Cofeco consists of several individuals that encounter daily pro-
ceedings and partake in inquiries supervised by a general secretary that
answers to a commissioner.61 The president elects five commissioners to
rule on decisions that can be appealed internally through Cofeco and
then ultimately appealed to federal courts. 62 Presently, Cofeco maintains
an annual budget of $15 million U.S. dollars and consists of over 150 staff
members with a majority of staff members having economic rather than
legal backgrounds. 63
Furthermore, FLEC was recently amended concerning the provisions
governing Cofeco in May 2011 to strengthen the regulatory powers of the
agency. 64 The new provisions allow Cofeco to inspect on-site without re-
quiring a court order to search the premises and to impose a maximum
one year order to cease activities by setting a specified bond that must be
paid in order for the imposition to be lifted.65 Hence, the new provisions
endowed Cofeco with injunctive capabilities that allow Cofeco to act
prior to ruling on a case allowing the agency to be taken more seriously
by offending agents.66 Additionally, the new amendments allow offend-
ing agents to request oral hearings to dispute or supplement their claims
while previously, offending agents were only allowed to offer written doc-
uments.67 Regarding criminal fines, Cofeco may impose fines ranging
from 8 to 10 percent of the offending agent's revenue if it is the agent's
first offense.68 Once the agent commits the offense again, the fine
58. Id. at 7-8.
59. OECD, supra note 36, at 50.
60. Id.
61. Castafieda, supra note 5, at 38.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. OECD, supra note 36, at 50. See generally, Decreto por el que se Reforman, Adi-
cionan y Derogan Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley Federal de Competencia
Econ6mica, del C6digo Penal Federal y del C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n [De-
cree to Reform, Add and Amend Different Interpretations of the Federal Law on
Economic Competition, in the Federal Penal Code and the Federal Fiscal Code]
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 10 de Mayo de 2011 (Mex.).
65. Alberto de la Pefia, Antitrust Alert: Changes in Mexican Antitrust Law, HAYNES &
BOONE, LLP 1 (May 17, 2011), http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Publication/ab8
deab3-1 bl2-498a-bc5c-d96el 95f332c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/87d04d
24-dl6d-42b9-be5c-e29b69422bbc/Changes inMexicanAntitrustLaw.pdf.
66. OECD, supra note 36, at 50
67. Iker I. Arriola, et al., Alerts: Mexican Competition Law-Insight on the May 201




68. de la Penia, supra note 65, at 2.
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doubles and may reach up to 20 percent of revenue. 69 Moreover, the
offending agent may be subjected to three to ten years in prison if the
agent contracted to partake in monopolistic acts. 70
Although the criminal fines are severe, the new amendments allow the
possibility for individuals to acquire immunity through whistleblowing.71
Individuals that inform authorities of the existence of agreements created
to engage in monopolistic behavior will avoid criminal liability as long as
the whistleblowing individual submits to a leniency program. 72 Concern-
ing the involvement of the attorney general, the attorney general will
only be involved if Cofeco has efficiently investigated the situation and
has established the presence of absolute monopolistic practices that are
per se illegal.73 In addition, the amendments now allow Cofeco to initiate
class actions on behalf of consumers that have been injured by the of-
fending agent's monopolistic actions. 74 The amendments allowing class
actions stem from a bill amending the Federal Code of Civil Procedure in
addition to the FLEC.75
B. THE SECRETARIAT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION
The Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (Secretariat of Com-
munications and Transportation) (SCT) was created as the governmental
branch to regulate the telecommunications sector prior to the creation of
the Cofeco and Cofetel. 76 Essentially, the SCT regulated telecommunica-
tions in Mexico until 1995 when FLEC created Cofetel, an entity separate
from SCT.77 Prior to 1995, the SCT was the enforcement agency that
regulated the Telmex concession that allowed privatization.78 The con-
cession allowed Telmex to maintain a provisional monopoly of "domestic
and international long distance telephone service, but in return required
Telmex to expand its wire-line network." 79 Despite its role as regulator,
politics forced the SCT to play a smaller part in Telmex's privatization as
compared to other governmental bodies, such as Secretaria de Hacienda
y Credito Publico. The head of SCT, who also served as President of
Telmex's Board of Directors, was against privatizing Mexico's telecom-
munications industry, and used his power to delay its implementation. As
a result, President Salinas removed Lombardo and relegated the SCT to
play only a figure head role in Telmex's privatization, serving as "witness
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Marco Najera, Mexico's Major Antitrust Reforms: An Overview of Mexico's Major
Antitrust Reforms, Including Increased Sanctions and Fines for Violators, LATIN





75. Arriola, et al., supra note 67, at 3.
76. OECD, supra note 36, at 44.
77. Id.




Although the SCT played a limited role in the privatization of Telmex,
it currently maintains the power to grant concessions.81 Concessions are
defined as "licenses to operators," with each license containing the exact
manner in which the operator may act with regards to the services pro-
vided. 82 Specifically, the operators submit a specific business statement
to the SCT outlining the services with the hopes of obtaining the license,
yet the operator must strictly abide by the business statement once the
license is granted.83
C. THE FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
The Comisi6n Federal de Telecomunicaciones (Federal Telecommuni-
cations Commission) (Cofetel) is currently governed by the Federal Tele-
communications Law of 1995 and was founded by a presidential decree in
1996 as a regulatory body.84 Unfortunately, Cofetel has been and contin-
ues to be a weak regulatory body because Cofetel does not have the ca-
pacity to make independent decisions; rather, Cofetel decisions are
regulated by the SCT before they are implemented.85 Furthermore, the
SCT has the power to remove Cofetel commissioners at will even though
the commissioners are appointed to set terms. 86 As a result of SCT regu-
lation, Cofetel remains an inefficient body with the inability to truly regu-
late Telmex's monopolistic tendencies. This problem is aggravated
because Cofetel struggles to convince Mexican courts of the importance
of its decisions.87 In addition, Cofetel has made the decision-making pro-
cedure overly burdensome and lacking transparency.88 Thus, Cofetel's
lack of regulation and autonomy has resulted in "regulatory uncertain-
ties" regarding the telecommunications arena in Mexico. 89
Various other reasons exist for Cofetel's inability to regulate including
the deficiency of a legislative policy mandate, the lack of enforcement of
Cofetel rulings and regulations against offending agents, and the absence
of a bureaucratic and conclusive authority to implement regulations that
truly affect the offending agents.90 Furthermore, although one of Coftel's
main responsibilities is to apply regulations, there is confusion regarding
whether Cofetel may actually draft regulations. 91 The confusion stems
from the notion that Cofetel drafts "fundamental plans" on certain issues
"such as QoS and interconnection," yet the drafts lack the formalities to
80. Id.
81. OECD, supra note 36, at 45.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Noll, supra note 22, at 3.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 20.
88. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 790-791.
89. Mariscal, supra note 80, at 95.
90. Noll, supra note 22, at 9.
91. OECD, supra note 36, at 45.
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truly be considered a regulation and causes great confusion among the
telecommunication industry.92 The fundamental plans Cofetel drafts
about interconnection are relevant because Cofetel many times serves as
the intermediary between companies that fail to reach an interconnection
agreement, especially regarding pricing.93
Although Cofetel struggles greatly with enforcement and regulation is-
sues, the agency is structured efficiently and comprised of four commis-
sioners at the highest rank.94 Moreover, an essential requirement for the
commissioners is the need to have technical expertise, which allows the
agency to be technically competent.95 The commissioners are individu-
ally selected by the President of Mexico for eight year terms subject to re-
election.96 Unfortunately, politics play a major role in the election of
commissioners since past commissioner hopefuls have been blocked by
the judiciary through court cases.97 Once the commissioners have been
selected, the commissioners elect one member to be President of Cofetel
and, thus, all branches of Cofetel rely and report to the President while
the other commissioners only participate in the discussions and enact-
ment of regulations on the Board of Commissioners.98
Cofetel's largest dilemma is due to its legal classification as "un organ-
ismo desconcentrado"99-or a decentralized regulatory agency-and an
administrative body of the SCT.100 As a result of this classification, there
have been tensions between Cofetel and the SCT creating uncertainty.' 0
For example, Cofetel issued a resolution in 2007 to allow a program for
bidding on spectrum for mobile telephones and Wi-Max, but the SCT
halted these plans arguing that Cofetel did not have the powers to grant
licenses nor the authority to allow such a program only to reissue the
program under SCT powers.102 Hence, a possible solution would be to
change the classification of Cofetel to a "decentralised body" (6rgano
descentralizado) yet this status normally belongs to publicly owned enter-
prises as opposed to regulatory agencies. 0 3 Additionally, the change in
legal status to a decentralised body would allow Cofetel to have its own
legal status, control its own budget rather than depending on the SCT for
budgetary changes, and refrain from relying on the government to make
agency decisions making the agency a more effective tool to regulate the
92. Id.
93. Noll, supra note 22, at 17.
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. OECD, supra note 36, at 47.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 45.
100. Judith Mariscal & Federico Kuhlmann, Effective Regulation in Latin American
Countries: The Cases of Chile, Mexico, and Peru, CENTRO 1D1E INVESTIGACION Y
DOCENCIA ECONOMICAS 10, Nov. 2009, available at http://libreriacide.com/libros
pdflDTAP-236.pdf.
101. Id. at 9.
102. Id. at 10.
103. OECD, supra note 36, at 46.
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telecommunication industry.104
Cofetel's lack of enforcement has affected Mexico's international rela-
tions with other countries, specifically the United States, resulting in a
WTO Panel reviewing Mexico's lack of conformity with its GATS obliga-
tion in the telecommunications sector.' 0 5 In response to the WTO ruling,
Cofetel implemented the International Telecommunications Rules on
August 11, 2004 in order to replace the ILD Rules, which included provi-
sions concerning the obligation that Telmex negotiate settlement rates for
all Mexican carriers, the parallel tariff structure, and the proportional
profit arrangement.' 0 6 Many anti-competitive proponents applauded
Cofetel's response by enacting the International Telecommunications
Rules, yet the same proponents lament that a WTO ruling was necessary
in order for Mexico to allow Cofetel to enforce anti-competitive mea-
sures against monopolist giants like Telmex. 107
V. DOMESTIC ISSUES CONCERNING TELMEX
AND AM1RICA MOVIL
A. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL SYSTEM
FACILITATING THE MONOPOLY
Mexico's political system, consisting of an executive branch that is sub-
ject to strong lobbying powers and political powers of persuasion, has
paved the way for Slim to manipulate the system and continue to domi-
nate the telecommunications sector in Mexico. 0 8 Since the privatization
of Telmex, Slim maintained a cozy relationship with President Salinas
which facilitated Slim's acquirement of Telmex, and Salinas refused to
enforce antitrust laws against Telmex setting a precedent for Telmex. 0 9
In 1995, during the Zedillo administration, Slim helped keep inflation
under control by refusing to increase prices for a year and, consequently,
the Mexican government stalled and watered down a bill that was sup-
posed to allow competition to flourish after the designated Telmex mo-
nopoly expired.110
President Fox, on the other hand, initially decided to combat the
Telmex monopoly and announced plans to create the foundation for per-
mitting foreign competition in Mexico.' Specifically, Fox reorganized
Cofetel by appointing new commissioners and aimed to provide the
104. Id.
105. Oliver Solano, et al., Challenges to Effective Implementation of Competition Policy
in Regulated Sectors: The Case of Telecommunications in Mexico, 26 NW. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 527, 543 (2006).
106. Id. at 544.
107. Id.
108. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 791.
109. Id. at 788.
110. Id. at 789.
111. Luz Estella Ortiz Nagle, Antitrust in the International Telecommunications Sector:
The United States Challenges Mexico's Telmex Monopoly, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 183, 185-186 (2002).
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agency more independence and responsibility.'1 2 Thus, Cofetel seemed
revitalized, evidenced by its imposition of a 10 million pesos fine against
Telmex under the Telecommunication Act" 3 because it found Telmex to
be a dominant carrier for local and long-distance markets.1 14 Telmex re-
sponded by requesting an injunction from a Mexican court contending
that Cofetel regulations infringed on Telmex's operating license.'15 Al-
though Fox made minor accomplishments with regards to combating the
Telmex giant, his efforts were finally stalled because of staunch opposi-
tion by PRI and PRD legislators.116 Slim won political backing by the
PRI and PRD through the Acuerdo Nacional Para la Unidad, El Estado
de Derecho, El Desarrollo, La Inversi6n y El Empleo (Acuerdo de Cha-
pultepec)," 7 which endorsed infrastructure projects through partnerships
between the government and the private sector." 8 While the Fox admin-
istration made small advancements, the Calderon administration contin-
ued in the steps of his predecessors by allowing Telmex to continue
monopolistic practices without regulation.119
Apart from convenient political relationships with presidents, the
Telmex monopoly is enabled by Mexican courts that allow injunctions to
prevent litigation and administrative rulings.120 Specifically, Mexico's le-
gal system has a process regarding injunctions which permits regulatory
decisions under judicial review to be postponed in the plaintiff's favor.121
Courts implement the injunction if the plaintiff argues that such a deci-
sion will cause the plaintiff financial harm.122 Due to backlogging of the
court system, the injunction usually lasts several years and by the time the
injunction is finally heard in court, the regulation no longer applies be-
cause of changes in the telecommunications industry.123 As a result of
the abuse that occurs concerning the injunctive system in Mexico, Telmex
gains financially while new competitors suffer economically.12 4 Likewise,
Cofetel regulations continue to be subjected to injunctions because courts
require a justification for their decision, and Cofetel usually cannot justify
regulations due to the secretive nature of regulatory drafting proce-
dures.125 Most regulations promulgated by Cofetel have been subjected
112. Id. at 208.
113. Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, supra note 8.
114. Nagle, supra note 112, at 208.
115. Id.
116. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 790.
117. Acuerdo Nacional Para la Unidad, El Estado de Derecho, El Desarrollo, La Inver-
sidn y El Empleo 9 EsoACIos Ponuiicos 486 (2006) available at http://www.redalyc.
org/pdf/676/67601734.pdf.
118. Manzetti, supra note 14, at 790.
119. Id. at 789 (It should be interesting to observe how the Pefia Nieto Administration
will interact with the Slim and whether he will continue to allow the monopoliza-
tion of the telecommunications sector like his predecessors).
120. Id. at 791.
121. OECD, supra note 36, at 12.
122. Noll, supra note 22, at 20.
123. Id.
124. OECD, supra note 36, at 12.
125. Noll, supra note 22, at 21.
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to an injunction by Telmex or its competitors resulting in confusion about
what requirements carriers should abide by with regards to pricing and
services.126 Hence, the only way to end this "catch twenty-two" dilemma
is by allowing Cofetel regulations to remain in place until a court can
decide the issue. 127
B. THE LACK OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
Another reason the Slim monopoly has continued to flourish is due to
the lack of foreign investment in the telecommunications sector in Mex-
ico, and few investors are willing to invest capital in Mexican telecommu-
nications considering the history.128 Investor confidence was slightly
restored by the policy changes of the 1.990s, but implementing these new
policies was not sufficient to maintain foreign investment in the telecom-
munications industry.129 The first wave of foreign investment occurred
when SBC International and France Telecom joined Slim to bid for
Telmex in 1990 by purchasing 10 percent and 5 percent of the Mexican
telecom company. 30 Southwestern Bell also became one of the foreign
minority partners to invest in the privatization of Telmex.131 Sprint also
decided to partner with Telmex in 1995, concentrating on international
services with consumers, carriers, and corporations. 132 The Sprint/Telmex
venture was specifically geared at Hispanic consumers living in the
United States.133 Unfortunately, the joint venture abruptly ended in 1999
when Telmex wanted to expand into the area of money orders while
Sprint refused, which resulted in Telmex buying Sprint's shares in
Telmex.134 Furthermore, there was speculation raised concerning
Telmex's real motive for dissolving the joint venture such as Telmex want-
ing to work with other U.S. companies in the long-distance services
sector.135
Conversely, several foreign investors also attempted to partner with
Mexican companies to compete with Telmex with a prime example being
the joint venture between MCI Communications Corporation and
Banacci, also known as Avantel, S.A.136 Avantel's business model con-
sisted of providing a fiber optic cable network linking Mexico City, Mon-
126. Id.
127. OECD, supra note 36, at 12.
128. Id. at 99.
129. Marcus Eyth, The Telmex Saga Continues: Foreign Investors' Expectations and Re-
alizations In the Struggle to Compete in the Mexican Telecommunications Market,
14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 211, 213 (2002).
130. Id. at 235.
131. OECD, supra note 36, at 22.
132. Eyth, supra note 130, at 235.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 235-236.
135. Sprint, Telmex to End Long-Distance Venture, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1999, http://
articles.latimes.com/1 999/may/05/business/fi-34038.
136. Eyth, supra note 130, at 236.
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terrey, and Guadalajara in addition to providing long-distance services. 137
Avantel was eventually acquired by Axtel in 2006 resulting in connectiv-
ity in 200 cities including some of the most important cities in Mexico.138
Another prominent foreign investment joint venture consisted of Alestra,
which was created by AT&T and Alfa Telecom; Alestra later joined with
Unicom.139 This joint.venture provided several communication services
to Mexican consumers with a proposed investment of over $1 billion to
efficiently compete with Telmex. 140 AT&T ultimately left the joint ven-
ture in 2010.141
Another prominent joint venture that is still currently competing with
Telmex is lusacell, created by Bell Atlantic and Grupo lusacell, S.A.14 2
The partnership between Bell Atlantic and Grupo lusacell initially geared
its telecommunications services at local and long-distance but later de-
cided to embark on the wireless market and was allowed a five year plan
by the government in order to spread services into rural areas.143 Fur-
thermore, the government had previously approved a fifty year franchise
for lusacell in basic telephone services since 1957.144 In addition, lusacell
was the first company to offer cellular phones in Mexico.145 Thus, when
Telecel appeared in the mobile telephone scene, it quickly overtook the
mobile telephone market which had previously been held by Iusacell. 146
In March 2007, there was a massive merger between lusacell and Unefon
Holdings.147 Unefon belongs to Grupo Salinas, held by Ricardo Salinas
Pliego, an affluent entrepreneur in Mexico who also owns TV Azteca.148
Ironically, TV Azteca's broadcasting nemesis, Televisa, announced plans
to buy 50 percent of lusacell in April 2011.149
C. PROMINENT THREATS TO SLIM'S MONOPOLY:
IUSACELL AND COFECO
The competition between Telmex and lusacell really came to a head
when Telcel, Slim's mobile telephone company, infiltrated the mobile
telephone market through initial advantages that allowed Telcel to be-
come the leading operator with the largest network and around a 70 per-
cent share of the market. 50 Although lusacell has been attempting to
compete with Telcel, Slim's monopoly truly became threatened when the
television giant, Televisa, offered to buy 50 percent of lusacell's shares in
137. Id.
138. OECD, supra note 36, at 22.
139. Eyth, supra note 130, at 236.
140. Id.
141. OECD, supra note 36, at 22.
142. Eyth, supra note 130, at 236.
143. Id. at 237.
144. OECD, supra note 36, at 23.
145. Renteria, supra note 31, at 62.
146. Prieto, supra note 26, at 16.
147. OECD, supra note 36, at 23.
148. Renterfa, supra note 31, at 62.
149. OECD, supra note 36, at 23.
150. Prieto, supra note 26, at 16.
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2011.151 The new deal has united two previous rivals, Emilio Azcarraga
and Ricardo Pliego Salinas, in a quest to challenge Telcel's monopoly on
mobile telephones and Telmex's monopoly of fixed-line telephones.152
As a result of the huge merger, Cofeco instilled various regulations on the
pending $1.6 billion deal.153 Yet prior to instilling such regulations,
Cofeco actually prohibited the merger in January of 2012 due to concerns
about price collusion regarding free-to-air and pay television markets.154
Particularly, Cofeco focused on the fact that Televisa and TV Azteca are
the two leading television broadcasting companies and such a union in
the mobile telephone industry could eventually led to negative monopo-
listic practices in the television broadcasting industry.155 As a result,
Cofeco decided to appeal its previous decision by deciding that the bene-
fits for consumers in the mobile telephone industry outweighed the possi-
ble television market collusion.156
Consequently, Cofeco published specific regulations threatening the
two companies that if they did not abide by the regulations, the conse-
quences would be a 10 percent fine of their yearly revenue.157 One of the
conditions for allowing the existence of the merger depends on a bid con-
ducted by the government in order to allow the creation of another tele-
vision network to deter the Televisa and TV Azteca monopoly of
broadcasting networks in Mexico.' 58 Furthermore, the condition specifi-
cally decrees that if, after twenty four months have passed and a third
television network has not been successfully created, then the merger be-
tween Televisa and lusacell will automatically terminate.159 But this
problem does not seem likely because Cofetel recently approved a deal
comprised of two new digital television channels that would reach around
93 percent of the Mexican population. 160 Another condition imposed by
Cofeco is that television advertisers cannot be forced to become lusacell
customers.'61 Moreover, Televisa must allow advertising time on its net-
work to other competitors in the telecommunications industry, including
151. OECD, supra note 36, at 23.
152. Ivan Castano, Threat To Carlos Slim's America Movil Heats Up As Televisa Acqui-
sition Of lusacell Stake Okayed, FORBES (June 20, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/ivancastanol2012/06/20/threat-to-carlos-slims-america-movil-
heats-up-as-televisa-acq uisition-of-i usacell-stake-okayed/.
153. Cyntia Barrera, Update 1-Televisa, lusacell Accept Tie-up Conditions, REUTERS
(June 19, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/iusacell-
televisa-idUSL1E8HJAP420120619 [hereinafter Update 1].
154. Anthony Harrup, Commission Rules on Televisa-lusacell Appeal, MARKEr
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Slim's companies.162 Lastly, the merger must offer customers a new pay
television package with access to public channels owned by Televisa.163
With all the conditions in mind, Televisa and lusacell consented in writing
to the terms of the conditions imposed by Cofeco on June 2012.164
Hence, it will be interesting to observe whether lusacell becomes a domi-
nant multi-play participant again in the mobile telecommunications
industry.165
But the competition between Telcel and lusacell also came to a head
prior to the merger, when lusacell initiated a complaint against Telcel to
Cofetel, because Telcel had breached the rules of portability.166 Specifi-
cally, the complaint stated that Telcel had refused or delayed the PIN
retrieval for electronic devices concerning users that wanted to switch
telephone companies.167 Such harmful behavior by Telcel against lusacell
was in direct violation of the Federal Telecommunications Law of 1995.168
lusacell asked Cofetel to use its regulatory powers to discover whether
the violations were actually committed and to propose sanctions to the
SCT.169 As a result, Cofeco became involved and imposed a $1 billion
fine on Telcel because Telcel was also overcharging competitors for con-
necting telephone calls to Telcel users.170 Specifically, Telcel was charg-
ing competitors a higher interconnection fee for other users that
attempted to connect with Telcel users while allowing lower prices for
calls between Telcel customers.' 7 ' The fine derived from FLEC's amend-
ments' 7 2 allowing for the maximum penalty, 10 percent of assets belong-
ing to the company, because Telcel was considered a recurring
offender. 73 Furthermore, Cofeco allowed Telcel thirty days to file an
appeal, which Telcel quickly did.174 Besides filing an appeal, the Supreme
Court ruled that Slim could not partake in a legal move which it had
162. Barrera, Update 3, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. OECD, supra note 36, at 117.
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previously used to combat against lowering tariffs.175 The combination of
the above actions demonstrated that the Mexican government and regu-
latory agencies were finally ready take steps to create a more competitive
atmosphere in the telecommunications industry and to put an end to
Slim's monopoly.176 Unfortunately, the positive steps towards allowing
competition were halted when Cofeco decided to overturn the $1 billion
fine in May of 2012 in return for Telcel adhering to five pledges.177 Some
of the pledges included Telcel promising to lower interconnection fees, as
well as promising to offer plans that allow customers to be charged
equally for calls made within the Telcel network as calls made to custom-
ers of other competing networks. 78 Specifically, Cofeco asked Telcel to
drop the interconnection fee by 20 percent.' 79 Another concession was
that Telcel agreed to drop any current lawsuit it has instituted against
interconnection rulings. 180 Moreover, the rationale behind overturning
the fine was due to Cofeco deciding that it was better to allow consumers
to see an immediate benefit through the pledges by Telcel than to con-
tinue the legal battle with Telcel would ultimately end in a small fine com-
pared to the $6 billion that could benefit consumers through the
pledges.181 But some individuals argue that the $6 billion in concessions
that Telcel is going to give up is repayment for the $6 billion already spent
by consumers due to Telcel's unreasonably high interconnection fee.182
Overall, if Telcel does not adhere to the pledges in order to lift the $1
billion fine then Cofeco will continue to fine Telcel by up to 8 percent of
its yearly revenue.183
While Slim was able to avoid a hefty fine for his mobile phone com-
pany, Telcel, he has not been so lucky with his wire line company, Telmex,
which was recently fined $52 million for engaging in anti-competitive
practices.' 84 Cofeco fined Telmex after it discovered that Telmex had de-
175. Elisabeth Makin, Mexico Takes Aim at a Titan in Telecom, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/business/global/09tele
coms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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nied Axtel, a competitor in the telecommunications industry, admittance
to parts of its network.' 85 Specifically, Telmex declined to permit Axtel
to use Telmex's network in several locations in Mexico for over two years,
causing Axtel to fall deep into debt and even resort to a debt exchange
offer in order to maintain the company in existence.186
VI. EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. INTERNATIONAL FEATURES OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR IN MEXICO
Mexico's laws concerning international ownership in the telecommuni-
cations sector has greatly affected its relationships with international
actors, including the United States.' 87 Specifically, Mexico limits the for-
eign ownership of fixed line telecommunications by 49 percent while cel-
lular operators are permitted up to 100 percent as long as the ownership
is approved by the National Foreign Investment Committee.'88 As a re-
sult of the constraint on international investors, new competitors cannot
enter the telecommunications sector successfully and these constraints
impede competition by allowing existing operators, such as Telmex, to
continue monopolizing the industry. 189 Furthermore, such actions strain
international relations between the United States and Mexico because
Am6rica M6vil, on the other hand, has entered the United States and
other Latin American countries' markets and successfully engaged in
competition without the harsh barriers that international actors experi-
ence in Mexico. 190
The situation finally came to a head when Cofetel gave Telmex the
ability to fix the rate that was to be paid by foreign carriers terminating
calls in Mexico and, thus, required all other Mexican companies to abide
by this minimum rate.191 The Mexican companies gathered to participate
in a market-sharing system by price-fixing the minimum rate charging in-
ternational carriers, which resulted in infuriating American companies
that such incumbent-protective strategies were being endorsed by the
Mexican government. 192 In addition, according to the United States,
Mexico was violating its GATS obligations by endorsing such anti-com-
petitive behavior.193 Mexico was one of sixty-nine member states that
signed the GATS Annex on Telecommunications' 9 4 and submitted a
185. Id.
186. Id.




191. Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO's First Antitrust Case-Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping
Victory for Trade and Competition, 9 J. INr'L ECONOMIC L. 271, 276 (2006).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Schedule of Specific Commitments outlining commitments related to tel-
ecommunication services in Mexico. 95
B. THE REFERENCE PAPER IN THE 1997 AGREEMENT
ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
A large part of the conflict centered around the Reference Paper in-
cluded in the 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunications that incor-
porated pledges from member countries to maintain a competitive
industry with regards to telecommunications.19 6 In addition, Mexico had
committed to abide by "Articles XVI (Market Access), XVII (National
Treatment), and Article XVIII (Additional Commitments)."19 7 The Ref-
erence Paper includes six sections that establish commitments by mem-
bers regarding competitive friendly market access in the
telecommunication industry for service providers.198 Specifically, section
1.1 of the Reference Paper states that "[a]ppropriate measures shall be
maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers, who, alone or to-
gether, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competi-
tive practices."199 Furthermore, section 1.2 of the Reference Paper
addresses the safeguards as well as what anti-competitive practices apply,
including cross-subsidization, utilizing market information acquired by
competitors for anti-competitive purposes, and not informing or allowing
other service providers access to practical data about crucial services or
critical market information, with the intent of preventing the service
providers from effectively offering services. 2 0 0
Furthermore, section 2 describes the commitments for interconnection
by major suppliers stating that the services need to be "under non-dis-
criminatory terms, conditions, and rates, and of no less quality no less
favorable than that provided for its own like services or for like services
of non-affiliated service suppliers." 2 0 1 In addition, the Reference Paper
allows for members to delineate the type of obligations they are willing to
maintain, which are considered acceptable as long as the obligations are
transparent, competitively unbiased and are not per se anti-competi-
tive.2 0 2 Thus, in light of these sections in the Reference Paper, the United
States, on behalf of AT&T and MCI, claimed that Mexico had partici-
pated in anti-competitive behavior. 2 0 3 Mexico vehemently denied the al-
legations arguing that the Reference Paper does not force a nation to
monitor cartels or take actions against cartels and argued further that
cartel conduct is not considered an anti-competitive practice because the
195. Fox, supra note 192, at 277; see generally General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Mexico: Schedule of Specific Commitments (Apr. 15, 1994), GATT B.I.S.D. (1994).
196. Fox, supra note 192, at 277.
197. Panel Report, supra note 10, at 1.
198. Ortiz, supra note 112, at 219.
199. Fox, supra note 191, at 277.
200. Id. at 278.
201. Nagle, supra note 112, at 219.
202. Id. at 220.
203. Fox, supra note 192, at 278.
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word "cartel" is not included in the text or examples of the Reference
Paper. 204
The United States finally reached out to Mexico on August 17, 2000, by
requesting a meeting governed by Article 4 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of DisputeS205 as well as
Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Trade and Services206 to ad-
dress Mexico's failure to enforce its GATS commitment. 207 The parties
finally met but could not reach a mutual agreement on the matter;208 the
United States invoked the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO
to create a panel to address the anti-competitive measures endorsed by
Mexico regarding telecommunications services. 209 On August 26, 2002,
the Director-General composed a panel of a chairman and two members,
as well as third party participation of various countries such as Australia,
Cuba, Guatemala, and Honduras, resulting in a final report being issued
on March 12, 2004.210
C. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION PANEL
The WTO is recognized as the ideal forum for solving transnational
trade disagreements among member states. 211 The authority to solve dis-
putes is derived from Article 23 of the 1994 GATT,212 sections from spe-
cific agreements, and Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter DSU]. 213 Moreover, the General
Counsel of the WTO serves as the DSB by monitoring and facilitating the
several phases of disputing parties.214 The first stage of the dispute in-
cludes a consultation between the parties, with the complaining party
having the ability to request a dispute resolution panel if the consultation
is not successful after sixty days.215 In addition, only governments have
standing in the WTO, thus private enterprises must ask governments to
bring cases before the WTO, requesting consultations and then panels if
the dispute is not resolved. 216
204. Id. at 278- 279.
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The WTO panel hears oral and written arguments from the debating
parties as well as from third member countries and, ultimately, presents
the parties with a draft report allowing the parties to submit comments. 217
An interim report is then issued and becomes the final report if no com-
ments are submitted, and the final report is implemented at the DSB if
the parties do not signal a desire to appeal the results.218 If the disputing
party is found to have violated any WTO agreement, the panel issues the
government suggestions on how to comply with WTO guidelines and is
allowed discretion on how to apply the measures. 219 Hence, the panel
may only suggest how the losing party may comply with WIO guidelines,
rather than actually implementing enforcement mechanisms. 220 Further-
more, the panel may not award damages or compensation even if the
party is found guilty of violating WTO agreements, which, due to the lack
of enforcement and compensation once a ruling is issued, results in many
countries deciding not to bring disputes before the WTO. 2 2 1
In accordance with WTO procedure, the United States, specifically the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), declared on October 10,
2000, that the United States was requesting a WTO panel to decide
whether Mexico had participated in anti-competitive actions and failed its
WTO commitments. 222 The USTR brought the complaint on behalf of
AT&T, which owns a large stake in Alestra, and MCI, which holds 45
percent of the stock in Avantel.223 Both Alestra and Avantel are
Telmex's two large contenders with regards to long distance service prov-
iders in the telecommunications industry. 224 Alestra and Avantel are two
of twenty-seven carriers that are allowed to serve as long-distance carri-
ers and are affiliated with prominent American companies. 225
Prior to the complaint brought by the USTR, Alestra and Avantel had
filed a complaint in 1998 with the CFC against Telmex because Telmex
was obstructing Avantel from using toll free numbers for commercial cus-
tomers since Telmex was deducting a certain amount per call from phone
cards that were aimed at dialing toll free numbers.226 In 1998, the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also became involved in the
battle against Telmex because of Telmex's refusal to establish equitable
settlement rates for service providers in the long-distance telecommuni-
cations industry. 227 Hence, the FCC also became involved in this in-
stance in addition to the USTR by warning that if Mexico did not allow
the telecommunications industry to permit foreign competitors to ade-
217. Nagle, supra note 112, at 214- 215.
218. Id. at 215.
219. Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 217, at 530.
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quately compete in the Mexican market, it would delay Mexican telecom-
munications business ventures in the United States.228
As a result of the USTR and the FCC encouraging the United States to
bring a complaint before the WTO panel, the United States had several
requests and recommendations for the panel on how it should rule. 22 9
Specifically, the United States requested that the panel conclude that
Mexico had not abided by its GATS Schedule of Commitments due to
Mexico's failure to provide interconnection to service providers on a
transnational basis with sensible rates and conditions in accordance with
sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the Reference Paper.230 The United States' main
concern was that Telmex overcharges U.S. service providers for calls
originating from the United States costing U.S. service providers billions
of dollars because Mexico and the United States have the highest interna-
tional connection.231
Furthermore, the United States argued that Mexico violated section 1.1
of the Reference Paper by failing to stop Telmex from participating in
anti-competitive behavior and allowing Telmex to continue partaking in
cartel-like behavior under Mexico's International Long Distance Rules
(ILD Rules). 232 The ILD Rules were instituted by Cofetel to allow new
entrants in the market to acquire a fair price and prevent international
service providers from forcing Mexican companies to accept certain
prices. 233 Likewise, the ILD Rules regulate long-distance services as well
as the terms that may be included in interconnection agreements with
international service providers.234 For example, Rule 10 of the ILD
Rules states that the service provider with the highest number of outgo-
ing calls, in this case Telmex, has to set the settlement rate for other Mex-
ican service providers in addition to only assenting to a balanced share of
incoming calls. 2 3 5 Due to the high settlement rate established by Telmex,
most Mexicans have difficulty affording such telecommunications ser-
vices, and the situation is only exacerbated in rural areas where Telmex
charges an even higher rate because the Telmex network is less
prominent. 236
Likewise, Rules 2 and 16 address how carriers cannot allow more in-
coming than outgoing calls until they pay Telmex for the ability to accept
more calls than their designated amount. 237 Additionally, Rule 13 gives
Telmex the power to designate the termination rate because it had the
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largest number of outgoing long-distance telephone calls. 2 3 8 Hence, Rule
13 is viewed among Mexican service providers as a Telmex price-fixing
mechanism and Rules 10 and 16 are considered to endorse cartel-like be-
havior. 239 The problem with allowing Telmex to set the rates is that the
Mexican government is disregarding international agreements that nor-
mally set international calling fees.240 The United States further argued
that Mexico refused to give the United States access to public telecom-
munication networks and services through interconnection for scheduled
services and through privately rented circuits for scheduled services. 241
The largest problem is that Telmex clearly fits the monopolist category
since it went from capturing 70 percent of the long distance telephone
market to 81 percent in a few short years while still dominating 95 per-
cent of the local market. 2 4 2 Thus, Telmex, as a monopolist, is clearly
preventing international companies, specifically American associated
companies, from adequately competing in the Mexican telecommunica-
tions market.243
Mexico, on the other hand, asked the WTO Panel to hold that Mexico
has not violated its GATS obligations under sections 1.1, 2.1, and 2.2 of
the Reference Paper included in Mexico's GATS Schedule of Specific
Commitments, 244 and section 5 of the GATS Annex on Telecommunica-
tions.245 Mexico's first argument regarding section 1 was that Mexican
firms, particularly Telmex, did not engage in anti-competitive behavior in
violation of antitrust laws because the Mexican government had ordered
the firms to partake in such behavior, giving Mexican firms a state action
defense to the United States' claims. 246 Moreover, Mexico argued that it
was authorized to implement rules allowing cartels under the notion of
regulatory sovereignty for the purpose of advancing Mexican infrastruc-
ture.2 4 7 In particular, Mexico argued that Rules 10 and 13 of the ILD
protect domestic infrastructure by inhibiting the incumbent carrier from
allocating a better deal for itself than new entrants in the market, thwart-
ing large carriers from collaborating to disregard smaller carriers, and
preventing a price war that could lead all carriers to lower their prices to
the point of negatively affecting Mexican infrastructure.248
The WTO responded by finding that the ILD Rules violated Mexico's
guarantee to prevent anti-competitive practices under section 1.1 of the
238. Id.
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240. Nagle, supra note 112, at 228.
241. Panel Report, supra note 10, at 7.
242. Nagle, supra note 112, at 228.
243. Id.
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Services, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 195.




240 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 19
Reference Paper.2 4 9 The WTO began the analysis by focusing on three
essential components of section 1.1, which included analyzing the mean-
ings of "major supplier," "anti-competitive practices," and "appropriate
measures." 250 First, the WTO found that Telmex was a major supplier
because of Telmex's capacity to establish the conditions of participation
in the relevant market, which the WTO Panel found to be the termina-
tion of telephone services in Mexico.251 Second, the WTO Panel held
that anti-competitive practices included action by a major supplier with-
out agreement with other suppliers and is mainly based on the supplier's
ability to affect prices or supply through the use of a dominant posi-
tion.2 5 2 The largest concern behind anti-competitive practices was the oc-
currence of single firms in the telecom supply industry, which were
recently transformed from state-owned to private entities, demonstrating
dominant power in the market by keeping international competitors out
of the market. 2 5 3 Telmex's plan consisted of anti-competitive practices
that greatly increased American carrier's costs on the termination of calls
in Mexico. 254
Furthermore, the Panel analyzed the ILD Rules and evaluated whether
such rules endorsed anti-competitive practices resulting in a lack of ap-
propriate measures under Section 1 of the Reference Paper. 255 Conse-
quently, the Panel concluded that the uniform settlement rate and the
proportionate return systems dictated by the ILD Rules by a major sup-
plier, such as Telmex, were anti-competitive according to section 1.256
Lastly, the WTO Panel addressed what were considered appropriate
measures and held that they consisted of measures to prevent a major
supplier from participating in anticompetitive behavior.257 Here, Mex-
ico's commitment to adhere to its GATS obligations trumps Mexico's ad-
herence to the ILD Rules and prohibits Mexico from ordering Telmex
from engaging in repressive termination fees because the Mexican gov-
ernment cannot do so directly. 258
Concerning section 2.1 of the Reference Paper, the Panel concluded
that interconnection was not limited to domestic services; rather, the ele-
ments of interconnection applied to international services as well. 2 5 9
Moreover, the Panel found that in this situation, because the suppliers
connect their networks with Mexican suppliers at the border to allow calls
to terminate in Mexico, those services are considered cross-border as in-
249. Id.
250. Panel Report, supra note 10, at 190.
251. Id. at 191.
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corporated in GATS.260 The Panel also decided that section 2.2 of the
Reference Paper was not meant to exclude international interconnection
by contemplating the effect of section 2.2, which states that interconnec-
tion needs to be available "at any technically feasible point in the net-
work." 261  Additionally, section 2.2 focuses on the cost-oriented
interconnection and states that the rates need to be reasonable and trans-
parent and, hence, the United States argued that settlement rates U.S.
associated companies were required to pay were two and a half times the
amount those that domestic companies paid. 2 6 2
The Panel established that only costs gained while directly providing
interconnection were the costs to be analyzed, yet the accounting rate
established by each country is subject to the interconnection costs in-
cluded in the Reference Paper and cannot exempt countries from their
commitment to the Reference Paper.263 The Panel also took into account
that, in order to reasonably assess economic feasibility, the rate needs to
be adjustable to demonstrate the overall rationale that rates need to be
causally linked to services costs.2 64 The decision was strongly based on
evidence presented by the United States establishing that the rates set by
Mexico were not cost oriented, and Mexico did not refute the evidence
causing the Panel to rely on the U.S. findings.265
The last important part of the decision revolved around section 5 of the
GATS Annex on Telecommunications and whether Mexico had fulfilled
its obligations.266 One of the United States' main arguments was that
U.S. suppliers were not guaranteed access to public telecommunications
networks and services in Mexico in violation of section 5.267 Mexico re-
futed by arguing that the Annex is not applicable to the access to public
telecommunications networks and services regarding basic telecommuni-
cations services, and that no commitment was made concerning cross-
border supply. 2 6 8 Therefore, the Panel concluded that if a WTO member
includes basic telecommunication services in its schedule of commit-
ments, then the Annex will apply, including section 5.269 In addition, the
Panel found Mexico's rates to be unreasonable in addition to the notion
that Mexico failed to allow U.S. service providers access to private leased
circuits to connect to public telecommunications networks in violation of
section 5.270
Overall, the Panel held that Mexico had violated section 2.2(b) and
section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, section 5(a) of the GATS Annex on
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Telecommunications, and section 5(b) of the GATS Annex on Telecom-
munications.2 7 1 Finally, the Panel suggested that Mexico conform to its
commitments under GATS and asked the Dispute Settlement Body to
request that Mexico abide by its obligations. 272 As a result of the WTO
Panel decision, Cofetel instituted the International Telecommunications
Rules2 7 3 on August 11, 2004 to replace the previous ILD Rules and to
demonstrate to the international community that Mexico was adhering to
the WTO's suggestions. 274
X. CONCLUSION
Overall, the WTO Panel was a waking call to Mexico, demonstrating
how far-reaching and out of control Telmex's monopoly had become,
causing a strain on an important bi-lateral relationship. Yet, Mexico con-
tinued to defend the telecommunications giant in light of clear signs of
monopolistic and anti-competitive practices displayed on a world stage
such as the WTO.2 7 5 In addition, Mexico's blatant approbation of
Telmex's monopoly has affected its international reputation by frighten-
ing prospective investors from investing in the telecommunications indus-
try in Mexico. Such a lack of investment has only worsened the problem
by allowing the current monopoly to flourish.
Apart from causing international tensions and diminishing the appeal
of investing in Mexico, Mexico's staunch backing of Telmex also under-
mines several important anti-competitive and telecommunication agen-
cies, such as Cofeco and Cofetel, instituted to observe and check private
entities from engaging in monopolistic and anti-competitive practices.
Specifically, Cofetel has the potential to be a key regulatory agency that
could possibly keep Telmex at bay with the aid of Cofeco, yet the SCT
has continuously undermined Cofetel by regulating Cofetel decisions
prior to implementation. Ultimately, Cofetel previewed its potential by
establishing the International Telecommunication Rules on August 11,
2004 replacing the previous ILD Rules after the WTO Panel decision.
In addition, Cofeco has also established its potential as an important
regulatory agency by imposing a $1 billion fine on Telcel for charging
competitors a higher interconnection fee. Unfortunately, Telmex's politi-
cal clout allowed Telcel to remain unscathed as the fine was overturned in
return for Telcel agreeing to abide by five pledges which included lower-
ing interconnection fees and dropping a current lawsuit. The fine was
instituted because lusacell was tired of Telcel dominating the mobile
phone industry. Thus, it will be interesting to observe how lusacell will
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continue to challenge the Telmex monopoly especially considering the re-
cent merger between lusacell and Televisa, Telmex's counterpart in the
television industry. Only time will tell if Slim's monopoly will fall prey to
competition or continue to flourish.
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